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STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE 
This is an action for injuries to property arising 
:rom an obstruction in the City's sewer line which caused 
the sewer to back up repeatedly into Plaintiff's home. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
A Default Judgment was entered against the Defendant. 
The Defendant subsequently filed a Motion To Set Aside the 
Judgment, an Affidavit, and a Memorandum of Authorities. The 
district court, after hearing oral argument by both parties, 
fonied the Motion To Set Aside Default Judgment. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Plaintiff seeks to have the District Court's Order 
dismissing Defendant's Motion To Set Aside Default Judgment 
3ffirmed. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
NEGOTIATION BACKGROUND 
As mentioned on pages 7 and 8 of the transcript of the 
hearing, there were negotiations before the suit was filed. 
0 ::!ore detailed account of the negotiations shows the 
':llowing: 
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On March 30, 1976, the Plaintiff first contacted h~ 
attorney concerning the damage done to her home by sewage 
backflow. More accurate information was requested, re sear~:. 
was done, and on May 28, 1976, the Tooele City Council and 
Mayor Douglas Sagers were informed by written statement of:: 
claim asserted by the Plaintiff. This two-page letter out· 
lined the dates when the sewer had backflowed into the Defe:.· 
dant 's home. The backflows had actually started in January, 
1975, and the final backflow occurred on December 26, 1975. 
The letter also itemized the Plaintiff's claim for damages. ' 
A copy of this letter was also mailed to the Defendant's 
attorney. 
In correspondence dated August 13, 1977, from the Gul'., 
Insurance Company, a claim adjuster requested information a:·:j 
I 
Plaintiff's claim. I On August 27, 1976, the information re· I 
quested was supplied to the Gulf Insurance Company Group-· 
including copies of cancelled checks issued by the Plainti::: 
I 
to pay repairmen, etc. On October 6, 1976, Plaintiff's ··I 
attorney contacted by letter the Gulf Insurance Group reque: .. 
I 
a progress report. A copy of this letter was sent to the 
Defendant's attorney. 
On the 12th of OCtober, 1976, Plaintiff's attorney.,,, 
1 
informed by the adjuster for the Gulf Insurance Company t~:· 1 
the reason for the delay was that they had not received s: .. < i 
Dl , ... I 
information from the Defendant. On October 14, 1976, · ---
l. 
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attorney was informed that the Gulf Insurance Company was 
referring this matter to the Commercial Standard Insurance 
c:or;ipany of Fort Worth because the responsibilities for cover-
age should be vested in them. On October 14, 1976, notice 
of the Plaintiff's claim was sent to Crawford & Company, 
me new adjuster, along with copies of the information pre-
viously sent to the other adjuster. A copy of this letter 
was sent to Defendant's attorney. 
On the 20th of October, 1976, the new adjuster asked 
for additional information, which was sent to them by letter 
dated October 21, 1976. On October 29, 1976, Crawford & 
Cor;ipany said by a letter that the responsibilities for the 
coverage, if any, belonged with Gulf Insurance Company. 
On November 11, 1976, ·Plaintiff's attorney notified 
Gulf Insurance Company of the decision of Crawford & Company. 
It was noted that if some response was not received by 
~ovember 22, 1976, that legal action would have to be insti-
tuted against the City of Tooele. A copy of this letter was 
:nailed to the Defendant's attorney. 
On November 18, 1976, Gulf Insurance informed Plaintiff's 
attorney that they were denying the Plaintiff's claim for 
.lamages. After the refusal to pay the claim, the lawsuit was 
~lied and the Mayor was served personally on January 24, 1977. 
ADDITIONAL FACTUAL INFORHATION 
The Plaintiff did inform the City of Tooele, on or about 
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the 3rd day of June, 1975, about the sewer back-up. In the 
process the Plaintiff contacted personally Douglas Sagers, 
the Mayor; Dale Howard, the City Engineer; Keith Dymock, t;,, 
Sewer Plant Superintendent; and Stephen Hilton, the Tooele 
County Sanitation Officer, telling each about the back-up; 
however, the Plaintiff never used the words 11 sewer lateral''. 
At all times she referred to the 11 sewer line 11 • [See Plain-
tiff's Complaint, paragraph 9]. Plaintiff agrees that the 
City couldn't find the Defendant's sewer line. 
The Plaintiff then hired her own contractor, who fina:. 
found the obstruction and the cause of the obstruction, a 
broken section of sewer pipe. The broken pipe was located 
i 
approximately 125 feet along the sewer line from Plaintiff': 
basement sewer drain in the street belonging to the Defenda:: 
named Isgreen Circle, and not the Plaintiff's property, as 
stated in Defendant's Brief. 
The Plaintiff's attorney, after obtaining a Default 
Judgment on the 17th of February, 1977, gave notice to cefe:· 
dant on the 24th of February, 1977, by written letter that 
a Default Judgment had been obtained and requested payment. 
The February 24, 19 77, letter was delivered to the Defenda:: , 
attorney on March 4, 1977. [See paragraph 8 of Defendant': 
Affidavit]. 
The Plaintiff's attorney's last 
Defendant's insurance carrier was the 
correspondence '"'' · ! 
9-- - I November 18, l 1 11 - I 
I 
I 
.......... 
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in which the carrier denied liability. After denial, Plain-
tiff had no further obligation to correspond with Defendant's 
insurance carrier--to do otherwise would be a violation of 
ethics. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT ONE 
THE RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE GRANT THE DISTRICT 
COURT DISCRETION TO VACATE DEFAULT JUDGMENTS. 
The Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rules 55(c) and 
60 (b), grant discretion to the trial court to set aside a 
Default Judgment for a number of different reasons which are 
specifically itemized. In order to vacate a Judgment the 
:noving party must designate the exact rule upon which the 
r~ief is granted. The Defendant's Brief is silent as to 
which specific rule provides a basis on which the Judgment 
should be set aside. 
This Court, in 1973, in the case of Airkem Interm::>untain, 
Inc. v. Parker, 30 U2d 65, 513 P.2d 429, held in affirming 
the decision to not set aside a default judgment that the 
general rule is that the decision as to whether or not the 
)efendant had an opportunity to present his case is to be 
~.ade at the trial level, and that the Supreme Court won't 
reverse just because the Defendant's Motion To Set Aside 
:ould have been granted. 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
6 
POINT TWO 
THE TRIAL COURT'S DISCRETIONARY DECISION SHOULD BE 
AFFIRMED UNLESS IT WAS SHOWN TO BE AN ARBITRARY 
AND CAPRICIOUS DISREGARD OF DISCRETION. 
In the case of Thompson Ditch Co. v. Jackson, 29 C2ci. 
508 P. 2d 528 (1973), this Court held that on appellate reL: 
the trial judge should be affirmed unless the dee is ion is 
arbitrary and capricious to the point reflecting a clear ab~: 
of discretion. The Defendant has not cited in his Brief a:. • 
action of the District Court which was arbitrary or capric::_ 
The cases cited by Defendant are well-known to the Distric: 
Court. They were mentioned in Defendant's Memorandum of 
Authorities prior to the hearing on the Motion. These case; 
were also argued before the Court and still the Court refos1 
1 
in its discretion to grant the relief requested by the De'.e:· 1 
dant. 
More recently this Court again subscribed to this vie· 
in the case of Pacer Sport & Cycle, Inc. v. Meyers, 534 P.::' 
I 
616, Utah (1975), as the Court said: 
"The trial court has a discretion in determining 
whether or not a default judgment should be set 
aside, and we on appeal should not reverse its 
ruling except for abuse of discretion, to wit, 
that it is arbitrary, capricious, or not based 
on adequate findings of fact or on the law." 
This Court al so held, in Masters v. Leseuer, 13 U2d 293, 
.. 
P.2d 573 (1962), that relief from a Default Judgment on Jr: 
of inadvertence and excusable neglect is discretionary a:: 
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i:1 the clear absence of a clear abuse of discretion, the 
trial court will not be reversed. 
Thus, the Defendant has the burden to prove that there 
was a clear abuse of the trial court's discretion as it made 
i11dgments as to whether the Defendant has met the burden re-
quired by Rule 60 (b) or 55, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
POINT THREE 
A REVIEW OF THE CASE LAW AND THE FACTS SHOW 
THAT THE COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION. 
The Defendant, in its Brief and in its Memorandum of 
Authorities, has cited a number of cases dealing with Default 
Judgments. There are an equal number in which Judgments have 
been set aside and in which the Judgments have been affirmed. 
Corruron themes present in all cases are the questions of due 
diligence and control. The Defendants have had to consis-
tently show that they have acted with due diligence, Warren v. 
Dixon Ranch Co., 260 P.2d 741 (1953) Utah, and the Airkem 
case, supra. In the Warren case the Defendants were required 
to show that they acted in due diligence in order to obtain 
:avorable treatment. 
In the present case, the Defendant's attorney said in 
his Affidavit, paragraph 8, that he was unaware of the judg-
:tent until informed by the Mayor, who showed him the letter 
sent to the Mayor by the Plaintiff's attorney. It is clear j Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
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that after he became aware of the Judgment he exercised d1.;" 
diligence, but before the Plaintiff informed the Mayor, 
neither the Defendant nor the Defendant's attorney had dor.e 
anything to check on the progress of the lawsuit. In the 5,. 
paragraph the Defendant's attorney stated: 
"Because your affiant was not personally required 
to prepare an answer in the matter, and due to 
his heavy involvement in other city and private 
cases, he did not pursue the preparation of an 
answer further •.. " 
When the Defendant presented the Summons and Complaint to 
its attorney, he was aware of the nature of the lawsuit anc 
knew that the Defendant must answer the Complaint within 
20 days or a Default Judgment would be taken. To simply 
assume that somebody else, even an insurance attorney, wocl: 
answer for the Defendant does not show due diligence on the 
part of the Defendant or its attorney. 
Another essential element that basically the courts 
I 
decide in these cases is the element of control. If the I 
Defendant has no control over the events because of lack:'. / 
I 
notice or for some other reason, the court then properly I 
liberally interprets the rule and often grants an Order ::::1 
ting aside the judgment. Montez v. Tonkawa Village A~, 
215 Kan. 59, 523 P. 2d 351 (1974); Mogui Inc. v. Ambrose_3:;:: 
Rosenfield And Co., 21 Ariz. App. 565, 521 P.2d 1143 (19i~ 
Phillips v. Findly, 19 Ariz. App. 348, 507 P.2d 687 (197: 
Kennedy v. Meyer Co., Inc., 218 Kan. 387, 543 P.2d 937 1:: 
Utah State Employees Credit Union v. Riding, 24 U2d 21L Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Librar . Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
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?.2d 1 (1970); and Mayhew v. Standard Gilsonite Co., 14 U2d 
]2, 376 P.2d 951 (1962). 
In the cases where Default Judgments have been affirmed, 
the Defendants had notice and, essentially, the control of their 
reasons for defaulting was placed squarely on the Defendants: 
~' supra.; Airkem, supra.; Warren, Masters, supra.; and 
Boise Valley Traction Co. v. Boise City, 214 P 1037, Idaho 
(1923); Barber v. Calder, 522 P.2d 700 (1974); and American 
savings And Loan Association v. Pierce, 28 U2d 76, 498 P.2d 
648 (197 2). 
In the present case the elements of control are as 
follows: The City and its attorney are n·otified of a claim 
on ~~y 28, 1976. The Defendant's attorney is given copies 
of Plaintiff's correspondence with insurance companies on 
october 6, October 14, and November 11 of 1976, plus Defen-
dant's attorney had his own private communication with De-
fendant's insurance adjusters. On January 24, 1977, the 
Defendant is served when the Hayor is personally served with 
a copy of the SUI!lIIDns and Complaint. The Defendant immediately 
delivers the same to its attorney, who gives directions to 
his secretary to take care of the Complaint. Neither the 
~fendant nor its attorney take further action to actually 
notify their insurance adjuster, to request an extension of 
time, or to prepare an answer. All such courses of action 
which would have been proper are solely under the control of 
:~ Defendant and its attorney. 
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Thus, because the Defendant had control and did not 
exercise due diligence under the Utah case law, it was not 
an abuse of the court's discretion to refuse to set aside 
the Default Judgment. 
POINT FOUR 
MISPLACING THE SUMMONS AND COMPLAINT BY DEFENDANT'S 
ATTORNEY'S EMPLOYEE AFTER BOTH DEFENDANT AND 
DEFENDANT'S ATTORNEY HAD SEEN COMPLAINT IS NOT 
INADVERTENCE OR EXCUSABLE NEGLECT. 
In an Idaho case that is directly in point with the 
present case, Boise Valley Tractor Co. v. Boise City, 214: 
1037 (1923), the Court ruled that the confusion of papers o: 
the mistake and inadvertence of a clerk in placing the SUl!Ul[· 
and Complaint in a file where the Mayor did not see them 
would not constitute such a mistake, inadvertence, surprise, 
or excusable neglect, as contemplated by the statute in 
order to obtain relief from judgment. 
The facts in Boise showed that the Mayor had been 
served personally, that the Complaint was filed in a Public 
Utilities Commission file with the name of the same compar.;·. 
and that the error was not discovered until the Plaintiff 
made demand for payment. These facts are the same, but 1~ 
the present case, the Mayor gave the documents to the Cit;· 
Attorney, who gave them to his secretary, who then filed:'· 
I 
I 
l 
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complaint and Swnmons with the rest of the investigative 
material already compiled for this case by the Defendant's 
attorney, paragraph 7 of Defendant's Affidavit. 
This Court has also ruled in Masters, supra., that ordin-
ary memory lapse accompanied and facilitated by a clerical 
error in filing papers plus additional items was not excus-
able neglect. In the Pacer case, this Court al so held that 
inaction or failure to take action on the part of the Defen-
dant does not rise to the level of excusable neglect. The 
failure of a secretary to timely mail an Amended Complaint also 
did not rise to the level of excusable neglect, Doyle v. Rice 
Ranch Company, 81 P.2d 980 (California, 1938). 
It is a general rule of law, as cited in 49 CJS § 334, 
paragraph N6(a), that the law does not look with favor, however, 
in setting aside defaults resulting from inexcusable neglect, 
inadvertence, suprise, or neglect of attorneys in the perform-
ance of their duties to their clients. Such failure on the 
part of the attorney ordinarily is imputable to their client, 
unless their default can be excused as being the result of 
accident or suprise, that which ordinary prudence on their 
Fi!rt could have been avoided. 
The real neglect or advertence in the present case 
occurred in the Defendant's attorney' s off ice; however, this 
<n1stake should not be excusable. The next neglect was on 
':'le part of the Mayor, who was by the Plaintiff notified about 
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the problem in 1975, who received notice of Plaintiff's ck-
in May, 1976, who was served personally on January 24, 197', 
and who turned the Complaint over to his attorney soon the,,-
af ter, and then took no further action until informed by 
Plaintiff's attorney about the Judgment. As Mayor and Chie: 
Executive Officer of Tooele, the Mayor has a supervisionary 
role of all City employees, including the City Attorney and 
his secretary. Thus, the failure to properly file by both 
the Defendant and its attorney is submitted as not rising 
to the level of excusable neglect. 
POINT FIVE 
EQUITY DOES NOT REQUIRE THAT A DEFAULT JUDGMENT 
BE SET ASIDE UNLESS OTHER FACTORS ARE PRESENT. 
The Defendant has relied on equity to set aside the 
Default Judgment in both its Brief and Memorandum. A close 
review of the case law, however, indicates that additional 1 
I 
factors have always been present when the Court has set as;:, i 
UJ In the Warren case, s ,.-1, 
the need for equity and to avoid harsh treatment were nece:· 
a judgment for equitable purposes: 
sary; however, the Defendant must show due diligence befC:' I 
being able to obtain the more favorable equitable treatme;,:. Ii 
The Court in the case said: 
"Although a judgment may be erroneous and in-
equitable, equitable relief will not be granted 
to a party thereto on the sole ground that the 
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negligence of the attorney, agent, or trustee 
or other representative of the present complain-
ant prevented a fair trial." 
Sufficient evidence was available at the hearing for 
the lower court to be fully advised as to the Defendant's 
alleged inequities that should have compelled the Court to 
grant relief, and yet the Court was not impressed that any 
alleged inequities should have been remedied by setting 
aside the judgment. 
POINT SIX 
EQUITY REQUIRES THAT THE PLAINTIFF IS ENTITLED 
TO THE RELIEF PROVIDED IN THE DEFAULT JUDGMENT. 
Since 1898, the legislature has authorized cities to 
oonstruct and operate sewer· systems, U.C.A. 10-8-38, 1953 
as amended, and also given cities the authority to tax to 
pay for the operation of such systems, u.c.A. 10-7-14(2). 
Further, the legislature has authorized cities to bond for 
treatment of the sewer and to even tax to retire the bonded 
indebtedness, u.c.A. 10-7-7, 8, & 9. Thus, the responsibility 
for the operation of a sewer has been vested by the legisla-
ture with the city rather than with the citizens of the city 
as a matter of public policy. 
Before statehood in 1892, the Utah Supreme Court held, 
~the case of Kiesel & Co. v. Ogden City, 30 P 758, where 
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sewers have been solely controlled by municipalities, tha~ 
the city is liable for the direct inundations of property··: 
sewage where the sewer is negligently maintained by the Ci: 
In the Cobia v. Roy City case, 366 P.2d 986, (Utah, 1961), 
the Court held that the operation of a sewer system was a 
goverrunental function. The Plaintiff has complied with the 
Utah Intergovernmental Immunity Act, so that the issues of 
negligence can properly be raised. 
The break occurred 125 feet from the Plaintiff's base· I 
men t drain, the sewer line went from the Plaintiff's house I 
directly on to the neighbors' property, and then angled frc: I 
the neighbors ' property to a bigger sewer 1 ine on Is green 
Circle. The break in the pipe occurred in the City street. 
[See paragraphs 10 and 11 of Plaintiff's Complaint]. The 
Plaintiff had no idea where the sewer line was, and this 
should have been known by the City. 
The City was collecting a service fee from Plaintiff 
for the collection of sewage. The City, therefore, had a 
duty to insure that the Plaintiff would not be damaged fro: I 
sewage back flow. Since the break occurred in the City st:;·! 
there was no way for the Plaintiff to have control over t:;' 
sewer line. The City had the capacity to control and the 
responsibility to maintain its sewage system in such a rna::.;:: 
so that the Plaintiff would not be damaged by sewage back: 
Since the damage occurred, and the Plaintiff had no contr:. 
1 
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Jver the circumstances which caused the pipe under the road 
to break, equity demands that the Plaintiff have a Judgment 
::or the damages. 
CONCLUSION 
The decision to grant relief is vested to the trial 
court. It is discretionary and should be affirmed unless 
1t is an arbitrary and capricious disregard of this dis-
cretion. Adequate information was available to the Court 
prior to reaching its decision. In light of the case law and 
the facts of this present case, the trial court did not abuse 
its discretion by refusing to vacate Plaintiff's Judgment. 
The neglect and inadvertence of this case does not rise to 
the level of excusable neglect. Equity does not require a 
Judgment be set aside just because the Order could have been 
granted. For these reasons, the Order of the District Court 
should be approved. 
Respectfully submitted, 
FRE W. FIN INSON 
Attorney for Plaintiff & Respondent 
7 21 Kearra Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
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